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I. INTRODUCTION
There is a growing and legitimate concern that lurking behind the
benefits of the Internet's openness is the danger that children will be
harmed when they electronically stumble across obscenity, pornography,
or indecency. The Internet - the fastest growing medium of communi-
cation in the world - provides for the exchange of ideas on a massive
scale on a variety of topics limited only by the human imagination.1 The
system's advantages include cutting-edge information retrieval and the
opportunity to find and associate with like-minded individuals and to
exchange ideas with people with whom one disagrees on matters great
and small. The system's perceived disadvantages include in particular
the accessibility and abundance of "indecent speech." The Internet is
not, of course, the first arena in which society has debated the limits of
public speech. When such debates arise, the judiciary skeptically exam-
ines government claims that it is necessary to limit speech of one type or
another. Freely speaking one's mind without government interference
has been described as the bedrock of democracy; 2 as an effective check
on government power;3 as important to the pursuit of truth in the "mar-
ketplace of ideas;" 4 and as crucial to achieving self-awareness through
self-expression.5 The judiciary has relied on any and all of these reasons
in protecting the individual's right to speak freely and publicly.
In June 1996, two courts decided cases dealing with government
regulation of indecent and patently offensive speech in two relatively
new and evolving communication technologies. In Denver Area Educa-
1 See ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (the court estimated that
approximately 40 million people presently use the Internet and that by the year 1999 the
number of Internet users will have grown to approximately 200 million people).
2 See id. at 859 (Buckwalter, J.) (lauding protected speech as "the keystone, the bul-
wark, the very heart of democracy."); id. at 881 (Dalzell, J.) (noting "the 'democratizing'
effects of Internet communication: individual citizens of limited means can speak to a world-
wide audience on issues of concern to them.").
3 Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521; Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 596 (1980) (Brennan, J.
concurring); RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA AND NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE
ON THE FIRST AMENDMENT, section 2.04[2][a], 2-37, 2-38 (1994).
4 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market .... ); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 881 (Dalzell, J.) ("It is no exaggeration to conclude that
the Internet has achieved, and continues to achieve, the most participatory marketplace of mass
speech that this country - and indeed the world - has yet seen.")
5 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24-25 (1971).
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tional Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC6, the United States
Supreme Court heard a challenge to the government's regulation of inde-
cent and patently offensive speech on cable television. While the Court
upheld certain regulations and struck down others, the specific outcome
in Denver Area is not the focus of this article. As discussed below, it is
the methodology the Court utilized that is important for our purposes.
Specifically related to the Internet (and just prior to the Court's decision
in Denver Area), a three judge panel of the Third Circuit struck down
certain provisions of the Communications Decency Act7 which regulated
"indecent" and "patently offensive" material on the Internet in ACLU v.
Reno.8
It is important to note at the outset that the Court's specific disposi-
tion in Denver Area, upholding some speech regulations and striking
down others, cannot readily be transferred to the Internet setting because
of the factually different attributes of the Internet. Cable is a centralized,
tightly controlled, one-way broadcast controlled by the cable operator
acting as an information gatekeeper and bottleneck.9 The Internet, by
contrast, is a wide-open, interactive frontier that has no central control
figure because all participants may send and receive messages. Even if
the cable system has one thousand channels it is still a finite, closed
system with the capacity to accommodate only some speakers, either due
to technical limitations or high expense.' 0 The Internet provides the op-
portunity for all participants to be speakers at a low cost.
Examining Denver Area as a guide to Internet speech cases is ap-
propriate, however, because cable television, like the Internet, is a rela-
tively new medium of communication, and the judiciary is struggling to
determine the proper analogies and standards for reviewing speech regu-
lation on it. The distinctions used by the Denver Area plurality to justify
the differing treatment of different types of cable channels provide in-
sight into the constitutional analysis to be applied in the context of
speech regulation on the Internet. The Court begins its analysis in Den-
ver Area by examining the attributes of cable television and its sub-cate-
gories (i.e., leased channels as well as public, educational, and
governmental channels). After determining those attributes, the Court
6 116 S. Ct. 2374 (1996) (plurality opinion).
7 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 502, 110 Stat. 56, 133-35
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)-(h) (1996).
8 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
9 Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2466 (1994);
Jerry Berman & Daniel J. Weitzner, Abundance and User Control: Renewing the Democratic
Heart of the First Amendment in the Age of Interactive Media, 104 YALE LJ. 1619, 1622-24
(1995).
10 Berman & Weitzner, supra note 9 at 1622-24 (economic market forces will ensure a
limited number of cable channels because channels that are "idle" due to high cost of program
production will be dropped).
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chooses the proper level of scrutiny and the model for an examination of
speech regulation. The Denver Area approach includes describing the
medium's attributes, its accessibility by children, its intrusiveness into
the home, and the public's ability to participate in the medium.
This article will (1) describe the Internet, (2) provide an historical
view of First Amendment jurisprudence relating to government speech
restrictions on different media, and (3) contrast Justice Breyer's reason-
ing in his Denver Area plurality opinion with Justice Kennedy's public
forum approach in his Denver Area opinion. Turning to the ACLU case,
this article will (4) discuss the three-judge panel's findings of fact, (5)
examine the reasoning of the judges in ACLU, and (6) apply the Denver
Area approach to resolve the questions regarding Internet speech rights
presented by ACLU. Finally, this article (7) concludes that the appropri-
ate free speech analogy for the Internet is the "village green": an arena
for speech that is an interactive public forum.
II. DESCRIBING THE INTERNET
In recent years a growing number of people have begun using their
computers to communicate with others and access information on the
Internet. The Internet is a "network of networks" that interconnects
smaller computer networks in a global communications system.11 It al-
lows users to directly communicate with any other similarly linked user
without immediate human control.' 2 The electronic information and
messages that people send are broken down into sub-units or "packets."
These packets are automatically routed and rerouted to their destinations
through a series of linked, yet independent computers.1 3 This indepen-
dence reflects the military purposes underlying the creation of the In-
ternet; the military needed a computer communication system that could
continue as a "decentralized, self-maintaining, series of redundant links"
in the event of a devastating war or other disruption to communications
channels. 14 Subsequently, "There is no centralized storage location, con-
trol point, or communications channel for the Internet, and it would not
be technically feasible for a single entity to control all of the information
conveyed on the Internet." 15
Individuals can access the Internet by using a computer that is di-
rectly linked to a computer network that is itself a dedicated connection
to the Internet. Such systems are usually provided by institutions such as
11 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 830.
12 Id.
13 Id. at 832.
14 Id. at 830.
15 Id. at 832.
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a university or the military.16 Individuals can also access the Internet
using a personal computer and modem to connect, via telephone lines, to
computer networks already connected to the Intemet. 17 This service
may be provided by commercial "online" services, local communities,
local libraries, and even "computer coffee shops."18  Another option is
to link through a "bulletin board system" that offers dial-in connections
to the Intemet. 19
The Internet accommodates many different types and methods of
communication. This includes one-to-one messaging (similar to a first
class letter, a.k.a. "e-mail"), one-to-many messaging (automatic mailing
list services), distributed message databases (user-sponsored newsgroups
where information is "disseminated using ad hoc, peer to peer connec-
tions" that "cover all imaginable topics of interest"), real time communi-
cation (similar to a party line, a.k.a. "chat"), real time remote computer
utilization (sharing comjguter resources at remote locations), and remote
information retrieval.20 The ACLU court focused on the World Wide
Web and its use of hypertext and hyperlinks as the communications
model for the Internet; highlighted words, phrases, or images allow the
user to select the hypertext item and link to another type or piece of
related information.21
III. OVERVIEW OF FIRST AMENDMENT REGULATION OF
COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA
The Supreme Court has treated street comer speakers differently
than the print media; the print media differently than the broadcast me-
dia; and the broadcast media differently from cable television media.22
With each innovation in communication technology, the Court has been
forced to adjust its First Amendment jurisprudence to account for the
special attributes of that medium. 23 The Court has analyzed regulation of
street comer speakers based on the low access cost, generally universal
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 833.
19 Id. at 833-34.
20 Id. at 834-36.
21 Id. at 836 ("Links, for example, are used to lead from overview documents to more
detailed documents, from tables of contents to particular pages, but also as cross references,
footnotes, and new forms of information structure.").
22 Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2459 (1994).
23 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 873 (Dalzell, J., concurring) ("Nearly fifty years ago, Justice
Jackson recognized that 'the moving picture screen, the radio, the newspaper, the handbill, the
sound truck and the street corner orator have differing natures, values, abuses and dangers.'")
(quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)); see also Owen Fiss,
In Search of a New Paradigm, 104 YALE L.J. 1613 (1995).
19961
28 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 6:23
accessibility, and the government interest in traffic and litter control.24
The Court has analyzed print media in terms of editorial control,25 prior
restraint,2 6 and information accessibility as a requirement to a healthy
democracy. 27 The Court has examined broadcast media in terms of edi-
torial control,28 the reach of the medium into the home,2 9 and limited
speaker access due to the finite nature of the frequency spectrum.30 The
Court has analyzed cable television in terms of editorial control3 1 and the
large (though finite) number of channels open for communication.32 In
each instance the Court judges the intrusiveness of the government re-
striction by considering the medium's attributes.33 The following sec-
tions will discuss these First Amendment approaches to electronic media.
A. BROADCAST MEDIA
A broadcaster granted a license by the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) gains almost monopoly status with regard to infor-
mation distribution over the airwaves; further, only a limited number of
radio or television frequencies are available for those interested in speak-
ing. Consequently, under the "fairness doctrine," the FCC required radio
and television broadcasters to address public issues and to assure fair
24 Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (distribution of leaflets on city streets
cannot be prevented to further city interest in prevention of litter); Chicago Police Dep't v.
Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (government can not prevent speech on street adjacent to school
based solely on content of the speech); but see Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781
(1989) (government may "impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place and manner of
protected speech" if the restriction is content-neutral and narrowly tailored to achieve the gov-
ernment interest); United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) ("sidewalk" on Postal Ser-
vice property was not a traditional public sidewalk and had been reserved for the Postal
Service use, not a public forum).
25 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
26 Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
27 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam, Black, J.,
concurring) (the "Pentagon Papers" case which prevented government's prior restraint of
newspapers' publication of classified documents because of press' important role in keeping
electorate informed).
28 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
29 FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
30 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 876-
77 (Dalzell, J., concurring) (when dealing with First Amendment cases "in broadcast, courts
focus on the limited number of band widths and the risk of interference with those frequen-
cies.") (interpreting Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456-57).
31 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2419-20 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
32 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 877 (Dalzell, J. concurring) (when examining First Amend-
ment cases "in cable (media), courts focus on the number of channels, the different kinds of
operators, and the cost to the consumer.") (interpreting Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2452).
33 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 877 (Dalzell, J., concurring) (in analyzing speech cases on the
Internet, courts "must take into account the underlying technology, and the actual and potential
reach of that medium").
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coverage of both sides of an issue.34 In Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC35 the Court upheld the fairness doctrine because the public had a
right of access to the airwaves. Those interested in speaking, writing,
and publishing their ideas, without broadcasting them over the airwaves,
could do so unencumbered by third parties. In broadcasting, however, a
speaker could only address the audience by the grace of the station
owner. The Court was concerned with the rights of viewers and listen-
ers, and was not as concerned by the FCC's interference in the editorial
decision making of the station owner.3 6 Subsequently, the FCC repealed
the Fairness Doctrine as not being in "the public interest."'37
In FCC v. Pacifica,38 the Court held that the FCC could penalize
Pacifica Foundation, Inc., the owner of a radio station, for broadcasting
George Carlin's "Filthy Words" comedy routine at two o'clock in the
afternoon. 39 Carlin's routine included words that "can never ever be said
on radio."40 A parent complained to the FCC after his child had heard
the broadcast.41 In response to the complaint, the FCC placed a repri-
mand in Pacifica's file, which would factor into any license renewal ap-
plication by Pacifica. The Court upheld the FCC's action because of
broadcasting's intrusion into the home, its pervasive nature, the ineffec-
tiveness of warnings to the public that indecent speech was to occur, and
the ready access of the indecent speech to children "too young to read."4
2
The Court stressed, however, that its holding was a narrow one.43
34 Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1969).
35 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
36 Ld. at 379; but see Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S.
94, 126-30 (1973) (holding that FCC could properly take into account the fact that listeners
and viewers constitute a kind of "captive audience" and that the public interest required that a
substantial degree of journalistic discretion must remain with broadcasters).
37 Syracuse Peace Council v. FCC, 867 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1019 (1990).
38 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
39 For a transcript of Carlin's routine see id. at 751.
40 Id. at 729.
41 Id. at 730.
42 In Pacifica, Justice Stevens stated that indecent speech, like "fighting words," was "no
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and [is] of such slight social value as a step to truth
that any benefit that may be derived from [it] is clearly outweighed by the social interest in
order and morality." 438 U.S. at 746 (quoting Murphy, J. in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)). Justice Stevens had begun to create a hierarchical approach that
valued some protected speech more than other protected speech. Justice Powell's concurrence
sharply disagreed with this approach which allowed government to regulate protected speech.
Id. at 761. For Justice Powell, once speech was determined to be protected, it was all of equal
value anti equally entitled to protection. Otherwise the government could pick and choose
which speech was appropriate and which words were forbidden. As Justice Harlan said, "one
man's vulgarity is another man's lyric. Indeed, we think it is largely because governmental
officials cannot make principled distinctions in this area that the Constitution leaves matters of
taste and style so largely to the individual." Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
43 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 750.
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B. CABLE TELEVISION
As the use of cable television has evolved and expanded, Congress
has attempted to regulate it in several ways. Congress required cable
television operators to provide access to cable programmers that were
otherwise excluded from cable broadcasting.44 Congress' goal was to
open up cable casts to more voices and not allow cable operators to mo-
nopolize and control the flow of information to the public. 45 Congress
required cable operators to set aside a certain percentage of their chan-
nels as "leased access channels" for commercial lease by unaffiliated
cable programmers. 46 In Turner Broadcasting v. FCC,47 the Supreme
Court upheld this statute despite protests from cable operators that the
government was interfering with their editorial control over the content
of the channels. 48
The Court also held that cable television should be treated differ-
ently from broadcast television for First Amendment purposes. The ra-
tionale of the Court regarding broadcasting was that government
regulation of broadcast television was appropriate because the physical
constraints of the broadcasting spectrum limited the number of parties
who could speak.49 The government's role, therefore, was to assure that
different voices were heard and that the broadcaster in possession of a
valuable public resource used that resource for the public good. Though
regulations placed on broadcasters might limit their free speech rights,
the Court reasoned that the government served as a preserver of free
speech for those who might otherwise be unheard. Compared to broad-
cast television, the large number of cable television channels distin-
44 See 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1988 & Supp. 1993); Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2453; Denver Area,
116 S. Ct. at 2381; see also Erik Forde Ugland, Cable Television, New Technologies and the
First Amendment After Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 60 Mo. L. REv. 799, 802-03
(1995). Cable operators own and operate the cable network that links the consumer to the
cable system. Cable programmers provide the content that is broadcast over the cable systems.
Cable operators can also be cable programmers if they provide their own content.
45 The Court distinguished this type of control from the alleged monopoly enjoyed by
newspapers in cities that no longer have more than one daily newspaper. The technology of
cable, and the practice of local governments to grant monopoly status to cable operators, al-
lows the cable operator to be an information gatekeeper. Newspapers have no such control
over keeping rivals off news racks. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2466 (distinguishing Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974)); see also R. Stuart Phillips, The Fourth Estate
and the Third Level: Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Federal Communications Commis-
sion - Cable Television and Intermediate Scrutiny, 23 Pa Pi. L. Rnv. 651, 673-74 (1996).
46 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2381-82.
47 512 U.S. 622, 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
48 Id. at 2464; but see Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258 (government may not dictate the content
or interfere with the editorial control of printed newspapers).
49 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969); Ugland, supra note 44,
at 816-18.
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guished the two media allowing for different treatment of cable
television.50
C. TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS
In the 1980's, Congress passed a series of amendments to the 1934
Communications Act to protect children from the new commercial "dial-
a-porn" telephone services. 51 The amendments prohibited all obscene
and indecent telephone communications, regardless of whether the par-
ticipants were children or adults. In Sable Communications v. FCC, the
Court held that Congress could not place an absolute ban on indecent
"dial-a-porn" telephone services. 52 Congress could, however, criminal-
ize obscene telephone messages. The Court recognized the govern-
ment's compelling interest in protecting children from obscene and
indecent speech, but held that an absolute ban on indecent, yet protected,
speech denied adults their First Amendment rights to engage in such
speech.5 3 Upholding the law would produce a result denying "adults
their free speech rights by allowing them to read only what was accepta-
ble to children."54 Therefore, the ban was not narrowly tailored to
achieve the government's purpose. The Court distinguished Pacifica by
noting that the FCC action was an administrative penalty, not an absolute
ban, and that the dial-a-porn services were not as intrusive to the home or
as accessible to children as a radio broadcast.
IV. CABLE TELEVISION AND THE DENVER AREA APPROACH
Congress and local governments have both attempted to regulate the
cable television industry. As discussed above, the Court in Turner held
that Congress has the authority to require cable operators to set aside
certain "leased access"channels for commercial lease to cable program-
mers who are otherwise excluded from cable channels.55 Local govern-
ments similarly exercise control over cable operators. When local
50 But see Berman & Weitzner, supra note 9, at 1628 (arguing that broadcast and cable
television are alike because architecturally they both have a centralized operator determining
programming and acting as a barrier to diversity).
51 47 U.S.C. 223(b) (1994).
52 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
53 Id. at 105 (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639-40 (1968); New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982)).
54 Id. at 127 (citing Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (decision overturning ban
on reading material harmful to children)).
55 Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2472. The Court remanded the case to determine whether the
validity of the government's contention that the statute's "must carry" provisions were no
broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest in preserving the broadcast televi-
sion industry. Leased access channels are a certain percentage of an operators channels that
are dedicated to commercial lease by unaffiliated cable programmers. Denver Area, 116 S. Ct.
at 2381 (Breyer, J., plurality).
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governments grant cable franchises to cable operators they usually re-
quire the cable operator to dedicate a certain number of channels to pub-
lic, educational and governmental programming (PEG channels). 56 The
cable operator in response provides access to programmers presenting
local public interest programming.
In Denver Area, the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
(1992 Act).57 Congress intended this statute to regulate indecent and
patently offensive programming in the relatively new communication
medium of cable television in three ways. First, § 10(a) allowed cable
operators to prohibit programs on leased access channels that the opera-
tor reasonably believed were patently offensive. The operator was re-
quired to create specific policies and procedures for determining which
programs are patently offensive, and to apply those policies in a uniform
manner.58 Second, § 10(b) required cable operators who allow patently
offensive programming on leased access channels to "segregate and
block" those channels from viewers who did not provide an advanced
written request for such channels. Third, § 10(c) allowed cable operators
to prohibit programs on public, educational, or governmental channels
(PEG channels) 59 that the operator reasonably believed were patently of-
fensive. The Court held that § 10(a) was constitutional, whereas it held
§§ 10(b) and 10(c) were unconstitutional because they were "not appro-
priately tailored" to achieve the government's goal of protecting children
from sexually explicit programming. 60
A. OVERVIEW OF THE COURT'S OPINIONS
The Court produced six opinions in Denver Area, each searching for
the appropriate analogy to the Court's First Amendment precedent. Jus-
tice Breyer's plurality opinion garnered the votes of three other justices,
each of whom wrote separate concurrences. 61 Justice Breyer generalized
that First Amendment jurisprudence takes time to evolve specific speech
protections and that the Court should hesitate to set in stone rigid rules
for a medium in a state of flux. Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Gins-
burg, wrote that aspects of cable television were a public forum and
therefore should be analyzed using the already established public forum
56 This arrangement has been compared to (1) a public easement, (2) a reservation of
rights by the grantor (the local government), and (3) an exaction of certain rights in exchange
for the granting of a permit. Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2394.
57 The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, sec. 10, 106 Stat. 1486 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 532 (1995)).
58 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2390 (Breyer, J., plurality).
59 PEG channels provide access to programmers presenting public interest programming.
60 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2381.
61 Justices Souter, Stevens, and O'Connor wrote concurrences. Id. at 2398, 2401, 2403.
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doctrine. Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia, wrote that the sections should all be upheld because the statute
did not restrict First Amendment rights of the plaintiff cable program-
mers, but merely vindicated the First Amendment rights of the cable op-
erator's editorial discretion.62
B. Tim PLuRALTY OPINION'S APPROACH
Justice Breyer was reluctant to formulate a rule that would be bind-
ing on cable television while the evolution of cable television as a me-
dium of communication remained in great flux. He perceived a
convergence of different high technology communications systems in an
era of general deregulation of those systems. In effect, cable television,
telephone, and computer communications technology may one day
merge into a communications system very different from the 1996
model. The future format, structure, and attributes of communication are
difficult to forecast. Therefore, Justice Breyer refused to "definitively
... pick one analogy or one specific set of words now" that might stunt
the growth of new communications systems.63 Justice Breyer described
the Court's role as "enforcing the Constitution's constraints, but without
imposing judicial formulae so rigid that they become a straightjacket that
disables Government from responding to serious problems." 64 He fur-
ther stated that "[r]ather than seeking an analogy to a category of
cases... we have looked to the cases themselves. '65
Justices Souter and Stevens joined Justice Breyer's plurality opinion
urging that the Court avoid undue haste in determining standards for re-
viewing regulation of new communications technologies. 66 Justice Sou-
ter echoed Justice Breyer's approach of analogy rather than
categorization, cautioning against "settling upon a definitive level-of-
scrutiny rule of review for so complex a category."67 He urged "main-
taining the high value of open communication," while focusing on the
attributes of the medium in relation to the government's regulatory con-
62 This article does not address Justice Thomas' opinion at any length because the opin-
ion focuses on the relationship between cable operators and cable programmers and does not
readily translate to the Internet setting.
63 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2385 (Breyer, J., plurality).
64 Id.
65 Id.. at 2388.
66 IdL at 2402 (Souter, J., concurring) ("All of the relevant characteristics of cable are
presently in a state of technological and regulatory flux .... And as broadcast, cable, and the
eyber-technology of the Internet and the World Wide Web approach the day of using a com-
mon receiver, we can hardly assume that standards for judging the regulation of one of them
will not have immense, but now unknown and unknowable, effects on the others.").
67 I.
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cerns.68 Justice Stevens was willing to give less than strict scrutiny to
government regulation which opened otherwise closed communications
systems because "Congress should not be put to an all or nothing-at-all
choice" in attempting to promote more diverse speech in the early stage
of the cable communication industry's development. 69 Justice O'Connor
agreed with Justice Breyer's cautious approach, but disagreed with his
application of the analogy regarding public access channels.70
Justice Kennedy decried the plurality's "standardless standard" as
an evasion of judicial responsibility and a danger to First Amendment
freedoms. His view was that the danger lay in not having a clear stan-
dard to guide Congress, lower courts, leased access programmers, and
the public. 71 Moreover, standards prevent statutes from suppressing un-
popular, yet protected speech: "Standards are the means by which we
state in advance how to test a law's validity, rather than letting the height
of the bar be determined by the apparent exigencies of the day. They
also provide notice and fair warning to those who must predict how the
courts will respond to attempts to suppress their speech. '72
Justice Thomas criticized the plurality for "deciding not to decide
on a governing standard. ' 73 Instead Justice Thomas asserted that Turner
had equated cable operators and print media's editorial rights.74 There-
fore, the Court could not force the views of cable programmers on the
68 Id. at 2402. Justice Souter describes Justice Breyer's approach as "recognizing estab-
lished First Amendment interests through a close analysis that constrains the Congress, with-
out wholly incapacitating it in all matters of the significance apparent here, maintaining the
high value of open communication, measuring the costs of regulation by exact attention to fact,
and compiling a pedigree of experience with the changing subject." Id. at 2403.
69 Id. at 2398 (Stevens, J., concurring).
70 Id. at 2403 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I agree with
Justice Breyer that we should not yet undertake fully to adapt our First Amendment doctrine to
the new context we confront here.").
71 Id. at 2405 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part); see also Jonathan Weinberg, Vagueness and Indecency, 3 ViL. SPORTS &
Err. L.J. 221, 242 (1996) (criticizing Pacifica's "Alice-in-Wonderland" approach. "Not only
did the Court not require that the FCC apply a hard-edged, precise rule, it did not seem to
require that the agency apply any rule .... it was permissible for the FCC simply to make up
its speech regulation, in an unpredictable manner, as it confronted each new 'factual
context."').
72 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2406 (Kennedy, J.). But see id. at 2401 (Souter, J., concur-
ring). Despite Justice Souter's view that speech restrictions on new technologies need to be
reviewed based on the context of the medium and not by applying predetermined categories,
he acknowledges that "[rieviewing speech regulations under fairly strict categorical rules
keeps the starch in the standards for those moments when the daily politics cries loudest for
limiting what may be said." Id. at 2401.
73 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2422 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part).
74 Id. at 2421; Ugland, supra note 44, at 814 n.108.
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editorial discretion of cable operators any more than it could force op-
posing political statements on a newspapers editorial views. 75
Justice Breyer's approach may be criticized as too open-ended. His
approach raises the danger of letting Justices enforce their own point of
view in an ad hoc manner, and then excuse it as just a matter of selecting
the "right" analogy. The lack of categorization may prevent future jurists
from relying on the standards in "those moments when the daily politics
cries loudest for limiting what may be said."'76
Nevertheless, Justice Breyer argued that the categorical approaches
of Justices Kennedy and Thomas present the danger of strangling new-
born communication technology before it has a chance to breathe and
develop.
Both categorical approaches suffer from the same flaws:
they import law developed in very different contexts into
a new and changing environment, and they lack the flex-
ibility necessary to allow government to respond to very
serious practical problems without sacrificing the free
exchange of ideas the First Amendment is designed to
protect.... The essence of that protection is that Con-
gress may not regulate speech except in cases of ex-
traordinary need and with the exercise of a degree of
care that we have not elsewhere required. 77
Consequently, Justice Breyer avoided the categorical approach that
might have provided more guidance to lower courts and the tangle of
competing speakers in the cable television context.
Justice Breyer submitted a new test preserving flexibility that he
characterized as narrower than the categorical approaches: 78 "[W]e can
decide this case more narrowly, by closely scrutinizing § 10(a) to assure
that it properly addresses an extremely important problem, without im-
posing, in light of the relevant interests, an unnecessarily great restriction
on speech. ' 79 Justice Breyer reformulated the usual First Amendment
analysis because the Court was examining speech regulation in a new
means of communication that did not fit neatly into the Court's pre-ex-
isting categories. Rather than the usual levels of compelling, important
or legitimate government interest, Justice Breyer looked to whether the
75 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2421 (comparing Turner to Tornillo).
76 Id. at 2401 (Souter, J.).
77 Ld. at 2384.
78 Id. at 2385 (Breyer, J.).
79 Id. Justice Breyer sets forth another formulation of his approach while criticizing
Justices Kennedy and Thomas for "decid[ing] the case on the basis of categories that provide
imprecise analogies rather than on the basis of a more contextual assessment, consistent with
our First Amendment tradition, of assessing whether Congress carefully and appropriately
addressed a serious problem." Id. at 2388 (emphasis added).
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government was addressing "an extremely important problem." Then
Justice Breyer balanced "the relevant interests" to assure that the govern-
ment does not impose "an unnecessarily great restriction on speech."
This is apparently in place of the usual means-end relationship analysis,
which looks at "least restrictive means," "narrow tailoring," and "rational
relationship." 80  Justice Breyer's plurality opinion then addressed the
specific speech restrictive statutory provisions at issue in Denver Area
using the more flexible approach to new communications technologies.
1. Permissive Speech Regulation on Leased Channels - § 10(a)
Section 10(a) allowed a cable operator to screen leased access pro-
gramming and to decide whether its leased access channels would carry
programming that contained patently offensive material. The cable oper-
ator was required to screen programs "pursuant to written and published
policy. '81 The Court held that section 10(a) was constitutional. 82
Applying the fact specific analogy approach to this section, Justice
Breyer identified four key considerations. First, the government has a
compelling interest in protecting children from exposure to patently of-
fensive material. Second, the interests of cable television programmers'
expression must be balanced against the interests of cable operators' edi-
torial control. Third, Pacifica was available as a close analogy in prece-
dent regarding patently offensive material in the broadcast radio context.
And fourth, Congress' method of regulation under section 10(a) was per-
missive, not prohibitory. Justice Breyer focused on the permissive nature
of the regulations which allowed, but did not require, cable operators to
prevent the broadcast of offensive or indecent programming on leased
channels. Since this was not an absolute ban, section 10(a) did not im-
pose as harsh a speech restriction as the limitations mandated by section
10(b), discussed below. Furthermore, Justice Breyer considered the rela-
tionship between cable operators and leased channel programmers in its
complex historical context. Congress, in an attempt to promote diverse
viewpoints in programming, had originally required cable operators to
set aside some channels under their control for leased access program-
mers. Section 10(a) merely returned editorial control to cable operators
over channels they had previously controlled. Congress' action, there-
fore, was not as intrusive to the First Amendment rights of the cable
80 See id. at 2406-07 (Kennedy, J.) ("This description of the question accomplishes little,
save to clutter our First Amendment case law by adding an untested rule with an uncertain
relationship to the others we use to evaluate laws restricting speech. The plurality cannot bring
itself to apply strict scrutiny, yet realizes it cannot decide the case without uttering some sort
of standard; so it has settled for synonyms.").
81 The Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, § 10(a), 106
Stat. 1486.
82 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2390.
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programmers. Justice Breyer also regarded Pacifica as precedent for
regulating indecent material broadcast directly into the home and acces-
sible to children. Justice Breyer summarized his examination of the vari-
ous considerations as follows:
The existence of this complex balance of interests per-
suades us that the permissive nature of the provisions,
coupled with its viewpoint-neutral application, is a con-
stitutionally permissible way to protect children from the
type of sexual material that concerned Congress, while
accommodating both the First Amendment interests
served by the access requirements and those served in
restoring to cable operators a degree of the editorial con-
trol that Congress removed in 1984 [by requiring access
to independent programmers]. 83
Using the fact specific approach, Justice Breyer was persuaded that sec-
tion 10(a) was constitutional because of the permissive nature of the re-
striction, and the close analogy to the Pacifica rationale.
2. Mandatory Speech Regulation of Leased Channels - § 10(b)
Justice Breyer also applied his standard for new communications
media in examining section 10(b), the second challenged provision in
Denver Area. Section 10(b) required cable operators to relegate all pa-
tently offensive programming to one or more specific channels, and then
to block access to those channels unless a viewer provided a written ac-
cess request. The policy to be advanced by the regulation was to provide
parents and other adults control over children's television viewing. Jus-
tice Breyer, writing for a majority of the Court in this section,84 again
refused to categorize the speech at issue. Instead, he said that the regula-
tion did not pass even the lower level of scrutiny applied to protected
speech regulations that are "content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions. '85
Comparing section 10(b) to the recently enacted provisions of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (of which the CDA is a part), the Court
found that the 1996 provisions were "significantly less restrictive than
the provision here at issue."8 6 Congress had made the judgment that the
83 See id. at 2387.
84 Id. at 2391-92. Justice Kennedy, also writing for Justice Ginsburg, joined the portion
of Justice Breyer's opinion holding § 10(b) unconstitutional. Thus six Justices agreed with the
holding in this section.
85 See id. at 2418.
86 Id. at 2392. The 1996 Act's prophylactic provisions require blocking programming
.'primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming' on unleased channels. In addition,
cable operators must honor a subscriber's request to block any, or all, programs on any chan-
nel to which he or she does not wish to subscribe. And manufacturers, in the future, will have
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1996 regulations were an appropriate response to a similar problem re-
garding children's access to indecent programming. This illustrated that
the 1992 cable restrictions were more restrictive than necessary to
achieve the government's interest. The inability to meet even a less-
than-strict, yet heightened, intermediate scrutiny standard when applied
to protected speech doomed the 1992 restriction.87
The absolute requirement in section 10(b) that the cable operator
"segregate and block" the programming it reasonably believed to be "pa-
tently offensive" was fatal to the regulation. The government required
cable operators to restrict speech. The permissive nature of section 10(a)
reduced the seriousness of the speech restriction. The absolute nature of
section 10(b) heightened the intrusiveness of the restriction on speech to
an unconstitutional level.
3. Permissive Speech Regulation on "PEG" Channels -
§ 10(c)
Justice Breyer found significance in the distinction between the con-
stitutionally sound permissive speech regulation of section 10(a) and the
constitutionally flawed mandatory speech regulation of section 10(b).
Justice Breyer struck down Section 10(c)'s permissive speech regulation
on public, educational, and governmental channels (PEG), however, be-
cause PEG channels presented a different First Amendment context. 88
Specifically, the historical and institutional background of PEG channels
and the presence of an existing system of community controls led Justice
Breyer to determine that even a permissive speech restriction exercised
by cable operators would be too burdensome. 89
to make television sets with a so-called 'V-chip' - a device that will be able automatically to
identify and block sexually explicit or violent programs." Id.
87 Id. at 2393 ("[W]e can take Congress' different, and significantly less restrictive, treat-
ment of a highly similar problem at least as some indication that more restrictive means are not
'essential' (or will not prove very helpful))." (emphasis in original) (citing Boos v. Barry, 485
U.S. 312, 329 (1988)).
It is interesting to note that in the time it takes for any challenged regulation to reach the
Court, new technology will most likely be developed that will inevitably create a less restric-
tive means of achieving the government's interest. The ironic result is that many new media
speech restrictions will immediately be unconstitutional because any means Congress uses to
achieve its interest will not be the least restrictive means available by the time the Court
decides the case.
88 Id. at 2398 (Stevens, J., concurring) ('The difference between § 10(a) and § 10(c) is
the difference between a permit and a prohibition."); but see id. at 2403 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part) ("I find the features shared by § 10(a), which covers leased
access channels, and § 10(c), which covers public access channels, to be more significant than
the differences .... Both §§ 10(a) and 10(c) serve an important governmental interest: the
well-established compelling interest of protecting children from exposure to indecent
material.").
89 Id. at 2394-97 (Breyer, J.).
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Historically, PEG channels were created pursuant to local govern-
ment demands on the cable operator for dedications or exactions of chan-
nels for the public good in exchange for the awarding of a cable
contract.90 Section 10(c) granted new censorial powers to the cable op-
erator over channels that were never a part of his "bundle of rights,"
because the local government in effect "reserved" those channels for the
public good - the cable operator never had editorial control over PEG
channels. Justice Breyer distinguished this from section 10(a) where the
statute restored a cable operator's control over the leased channels that
were at one time under his control.91
The cable programmer (lessee) of a leased channel has editorial
control over the material presented on that program. PEG channels are,
however, generally organized and operated by non-profit groups or by
the local government itself. The plurality found this difference to be sig-
nificant because PEG channels have an editorial entity other than the
cable operator who will be responsive to the community rather than to
the economic marketplace. Because "indecent" and "patently offensive"
programming is determined on a community by community basis, this
separate entity will most likely achieve the government's interest in pro-
tecting children from offensive programming without giving veto power
to the cable operator. Therefore section 10(c)'s permissive speech re-
striction power granted to cable operators on PEG channels is superflu-
ous to an existing system of editorial control. One level of censors is
sufficient.92
C. JusTIcE KENNEDY AND THE PUBLIC FORUM APPROACH
Justice Kennedy's opinion in Denver Area took a very different ap-
proach in addressing the free speech issue in the cable television context.
His solution was to characterize public access channels as public fora93
and leased access channels as common carriers; he described the latter as
the functional equivalent of public fora.94 Since section 10 regulates pro-
tected speech based on the speech's content, Justice Kennedy used a
90 Id. at 2394.
91 But see id. at 2404 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I am not
persuaded that the difference in the origin of the access channels is sufficient to justify uphold-
ing § 10(a) and striking down § 10(c). The interest in protecting children remains the same,
whether on a leased access channel or a public access channel.").
92 Id. at 2395. ("Mhe existence of a system aimed at encouraging and securing pro-
gramming that the community considers valuable strongly suggests that a 'cable operator's
veto' is less likely necessary to achieve the statute's basic objective, protecting children, than a
similar veto in the context of leased channels .... And this latter (veto) threat must bulk large
within a system that already has publicly accountable systems for maintaining responsible
programs.").
93 Id. at 2409.
94 Id. at 2411-12.
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strict scrutiny analysis of content-based restrictions in a public forum.
Justice Kennedy found that the statute could not withstand that level of
scrutiny and on that basis found the speech restrictions in §§ 10(a) and
(c) unconstitutional. 95
Justice Kennedy first focused on the public forum characteristics of
public access channels.96 By making an analogy between the public ac-
cess channels and public easements, Justice Kennedy described the ac-
cess channels as a contractually bargained for right that the cable
operator gives to the local government (or the local government reserves
from its grant) in return for the ability to use the local utility conduits and
right-of-ways. 97 The local government then specifically sets aside this
new "space" for public discourse, thus designating a public forum.
Justice Kennedy described a public access channel as an unlimited
designated public forum.98 This means it is a government-controlled
area committed to, or allowed to be used for, free speech purposes and
open to all speakers. 99 Once a forum is open as a place where expressive
activity may occur, the government cannot pick and choose speakers
based on the content of their ideas. Silencing a disfavored topic or style
of speech because the government dislikes the message violates the First
Amendment and requires strict judicial scrutiny. Thus the government
may not provide an arena as a public forum, but then exclude those with
whom it disagrees.
Justice Kennedy determined that leased access channels were analo-
gous to common carriers, such as telephone companies, which are re-
quired to "provide a conduit for the speech of others." 100 He also saw
common carriers as the functional equivalent of public fora, because they
95 Justice Kennedy joined the section of Justice Breyer's opinion holding § 10(b) uncon-
stitutional "insofar as it applies strict scrutiny." Id. at 2419. Justice Breyer, however, appar-
ently held that section unconstitutional because it could not pass even a lower level of scrutiny.
96 Id. at 2408-09. Justice Kennedy had less concern regarding the governmental and
educational channels since those access channels were not an open public forum dedicated to
bringing other voices to the public debate, but instead were presenting the views allowed by
the local government.
97 Id. at 2409.
98 But see Ugland, supra note 44, at 815, n. 110 (cable systems are not public forums;
they are speakers that use public forums).
99 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2409 ("Public forums do not have to be physical gathering
places, nor are they limited to property owned by the government.") (citations omitted); see
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939) (Roberts, J., plurality opinion) ("Wherever the title of
streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for purpose of assembly, communicating thoughts
between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of
citizens.").
100 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2411-12; see Jason Kay, Note, Sexuality, Live Without A
Net: Regulating Obscenity and Indecency on the Global Network, 4 S. CAL. INTERDIscrtLi-
NARY L. 355, 372-374 (1996). But see Ugland, supra note 44, at 814, n.108 (Turner implic-
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provide a "place" for open, non-discriminatory communication.101 Jus-
tice Kennedy saw Sable as directly on point.102 In Sable the government
banned indecent speech over the telephone. In Denver Area the govern-
ment restricted indecent speech on cable television. In both cases, the
government engaged in unconstitutional content-based discrimination
against a certain type of disfavored speech on a common carrier. Appli-
cation of strict scrutiny to speech-related regulation of common carriers
"ensures open, nondiscriminatory access to the means of communica-
tion."'103 Justice Kennedy was frustrated by the plurality's failure to ex-
plain why it would not apply strict scrutiny to content-based "selective
exclusions" of protected speech.
V. INDECENT SPEECH ON THE INTERNET AND
ACLU v. RENO
In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act104
(CDA) to combat the perceived flood of obscene, indecent, and patently
offensive material available to children via the Internet. Section 223(a)
criminalizes speech if a person "knowingly... makes, creates, or solic-
its" and "initiates the transmission" of "any comment, request, sugges-
tion, proposal, image or other communication which is obscene or
indecent, knowing that the recipient of the communication is under 18
years of age." 105 Moreover, section 223(d) criminalizes speech if it "in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or or-
itly rejected the common carrier model when it acknowledged First Amendment editorial
rights of cable operators).
101 Denver Area, 116 S. CL at 2413 ("Common carrier requirements of leased access are
little different in function from designated public forums, and no different standard of review
should apply.").
102 See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
103 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2412. See also Kay, supra note 100, at 373 ("Many [In-
ternet] features are directly analogous to other common carrier services. E-mail, for instance,
is directly equivalent to its land-based counterpart. The Internet Relay Chat (IRC) works
much like either a private telephone line or a party line, depending on the number of parties
chatting. Searching for a file on the World Wide Web is not unlike calling directory assistance
to retrieve a phone number or address.").
104 47 U.S.C. §§ 223(a)-(h) (Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
§ 502, 110 Stat. 56, 133-35).
105 § 223(a) subjects to criminal liability anyone who "(1) in interstate or foreign commu-
nications ... (B) by means of a telecommunications device knowingly (i) makes, creates, or
solicits, and (ii) initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal, im-
age, or other communication which is obscene or indecent, knowing that the recipient of the
communication is under 18 years of age, regardless of whether the maker of such communica-
tion placed the call or initiated the communication; ... (2) knowingly permits any telecommu-
nications facility under his control to be used for any activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with
the intent that it be used for such activity."
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gans, regardless of whether the user of such service placed the call or
initiated the communication. '10 6
The CDA provides specific defenses to prosecution under the above
sections. 107 First, defenses are available to access providers who do not
create or knowingly distribute content in violation of the CDA. Second,
a defense limits vicarious employer liability. A third defense is a "good
faith" effort to limit access to minors using available technology. Fi-
nally, a defense is also available for those restricting minors' access by
requiring use of "a verified credit card, debit account, adult access code,
or adult personal identification number."
The statutory language regarding "indecency" and "patently offen-
sive material" was immediately challenged by a diverse group of plain-
tiffs including businesses, non-profit organizations, advocacy groups,
commercial on-line services, and library organizations. 108 None of the
plaintiffs were commercial pornographers.10 9 The plaintiffs in ACLU did
not challenge the CDA on grounds that it regulated obscenity or pornog-
raphy, but rather that it regulated indecency.110
The three ACLU judges, writing separately, found the provisions of
the CDA unconstitutional for different, but overlapping reasons. Judge
Dalzell, employing a medium-specific approach, found that the Internet
is a unique medium of mass communication and that the CDA would
homogenize speech on it. Judge Sloviter found that the CDA constituted
content-based discrimination against First Amendment protected speech
and could not pass strict scrutiny because it was not narrowly tailored to
achieve a compelling government interest. Judge Buckwalter viewed the
ill-defined use of the words "indecent" and "patently offensive" as un-
constitutionally vague, thus chilling free speech.
106 § 223(d) imposes criminal penalties on anyone who "(1) in interstate or foreign com-
munications knowingly (A) uses an interactive computer service to send to a specific person or
persons under 18 years of age, or (B) uses any interactive computer service to display in a
manner available to a person under 18 years of age, any comment, request, suggestion, propo-
sal, image or other communication that, in context, depicts or describes, in terms patently
offensive as measured by contemporary community standards, sexual or excretory activities or
organs, regardless of whether the use of such service placed the call or initiated the communi-
cation; or (2) knowingly permits any telecommunications facility under such person's control
to be used for an activity prohibited by paragraph (1) with the intent that it be used for such
activity."
107 47 U.S.C. 223(e).
108 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 827 n.2.
109 Id.
1 M Id. at 829.
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A. FINDINGS OF FACT
In an effort to expedite the proceedings, the parties entered into a
lengthy stipulation of facts. 1 ' The court derived many of its findings of
fact from the stipulation. 112 The full findings of fact are summarized
here as an aid to the reader and to provide context for the legal discussion
to follow. ACLU is the most comprehensive attempt to describe the In-
ternet through judicial fact-finding. After reviewing the history and gen-
eral structure of the Internet, 113 the court addressed issues of fact
particularly relevant to First Amendment analysis.
The court found that the content on the Internet is both commercial
and non-commercial speech and "is as diverse as human thought."114
"[T]he Internet provides an easy and inexpensive way for a speaker to
reach a large audience, potentially of millions." 115 Importantly, it is an
interactive form of communication allowing users to be both speaker and
audience.'" 6 "The Internet is therefore a unique and wholly new medium
of worldwide human communication." 117
The court found that the level of communication and message so-
phistication on the Internet varied greatly.118 Users range from large cor-
porations and universities with sophisticated mainframe computers to
individuals with a personal computer." 9 Significantly, the court found
that the World Wide Web is a "distributed system with no centralized
control... from which individual Web sites or services can be blocked
from the Web."'120 The court did find, however, that a process is under
way to rate content on the Internet to assist parents in "screening and
filtering" material that they feel is unsuitable for their children.' 2 ' Fur-
ther, commercial screening services exist that provide software and
blocking services to assist in preventing subscriber access to certain
topics.' 22
The court found that sexually explicit material of varying degrees
exists on the Internet.1' 3 Once posted on the Internet, it is accessible to
anyone entering a particular Web site or seeking information retrieval.
I H Id. at 828.
112 Id. at 831.
113 See supra notes 11-21 and accoppanying text.
114 See ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 842.
115 Id at 843.
116 See id.
117 Id. at 844.
118 See id. at 836-37.
119 See id.
120 Id. at 838.
121 See id. at 838-39.
122 See id. at 839-42.
123 See id. at 844.
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The content provider has no control over who may receive it.124 None-
theless, the Internet can be accessed only through a series of affirmative,
deliberate steps. 125 The court specifically found that "[c]ommunications
over the Internet do not 'invade' an individual's home" or appear without
providing prior information as to their content.126 The court also found
that without adult assistance a young child would not be able to retrieve
material easily. 127
The court found that there is no reliable way to use age verification
as a means for restricting children's access to certain sites. 128 If the site
contains "indecent" material, there is no way for a content provider to
screen that material from viewers who are minors, and still allow them
access to the material that is not "indecent."' 129 Currently there is no
software available for credit card verification as a screening tool. 130
Even if such technology becomes available, most non-profit sites and
individual homepages could not afford the cost of verification services
and would have to close their sites.131 Charging users for access to the
sites to offset the cost of verification would necessarily inhibit the free
flow of information. 132 Further, those adults who do not have a credit
card could not access the information.' 33 Other adult verification sys-
tems, such as password systems, would likewise inhibit free speech and
be cost prohibitive for many content providers. 134 The court also found
the proposal for "tagging" sites to be insufficient. Tagged sites would
have an imbedded code, placed there by the content provider, that would
prevent access to that site for computers that had special software. 135
The court found this would be burdensome to non-commercial organiza-
tions, and would not necessarily prevent the transmission of the informa-
tion because it would only work if the adult at the receiving end of the
transmission had properly installed the software. 136 Further, technology
does not exist that would allow a content provider to send information to
a community that would not find the material indecent, and also prevent
it from being received in a community that finds it indecent.1 37 Commu-
124 See id.
125 See id. at 844-45.
126 Id.
127 See id. at 845.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See id. at 846.
131 See id.
132 See id. at 847.
133 Id. at 846.
134 See id. at 846-47.
135 Id. at 847-48.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 848.
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nications originating outside the United States would also present screen-
ing problems.138 "Many speakers who display arguably indecent content
on the Internet must choose between silence and the risk of prosecution.
The CDA's defenses... are effectively unavailable for non-commercial,
not-for-profit entities." 139
B. THE A CLU v. RENo OPINIONS
Because the existing Supreme Court analogies to communication
technologies do not provide an appropriate model for Internet speech
regulation, the court in ACLU examined the Internet's unique attributes
as they relate to First Amendment issues. The judges' ultimately con-
cluded that the Internet is a decentralized, open-access forum for discus-
sion and exchange of ideas. Most speakers are individuals, or non-
commercial entities and have limited financial resources so that regula-
tion would most likely drive speakers from the forum. Even if technol-
ogy existed (which it does not) for screening individual's identities prior
to participation in a particular Internet setting, the labor intensive and
intrusive aspects of such a screening system might force speakers to
abandon their web sites.
1. Judge Dalzell's Search for an Internet Speech Analogy
In ACLU, Judge Dalzell's framework is closest to the Denver Area
plurality's flexible First Amendment approach to new media. After re-
viewing the Supreme Court's treatment of various media, Judge Dalzell
concluded that "[t]his medium-specific approach to mass communication
examines the underlying technology of the communication to find the
proper fit between First Amendment values and competing interests. '140
The government's power to regulate indecency in television and ra-
dio broadcasting does not translate well to the Internet context. The gov-
ernment's reliance on Pacifica's treatment of indecency as applied to the.
Internet was misplaced because of the differences between the two media
at issue.' 41 "[T]ime has not been kind to the Pacifica decision. Later
cases have eroded its reach, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly in-
structed against overreading the rationale of its holding."' 142
138 Id.
'39 Id. at 849.
140 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 873.
141 Id. at 877.
142 ld. at 875 (citing Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,74 (1983)) ("regu-
lation of the broadcast media does not readily translate into a justification for regulation of
other means of communication," where the government's interest in protecting children and
the privacy of the home did not support a prohibition on allegedly offensive junk mail). Den-
ver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2415 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in
part, and dissenting in part) ("We have already rejected [Pacifica's] application of this lower
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Turner Broadcasting v. FCC143 was of particular significance to
Judge Dalzell in limiting the reach of Pacifica. For the consumer, broad-
cast and cable television are identical. Both present television program-
ming that is pervasive, intrusive into the home, and is easily accessed by
children. Yet Turner held that, for First Amendment purposes, cable
television should be treated differently from broadcast television. Com-
pared to broadcast television, the large number of cable television chan-
nels distinguished the two media. The large, but finite, cable television
capacity for speakers distinguished Turner from the technologically lim-
ited broadcast radio capacity for speakers in Pacifica.144 If the potential
for hundreds of channels on cable television removed Turner from the
reach of Pacifica's reasoning, then the potential for millions of speakers
on the Internet removed ACLU from Pacifica's rationale. 145
Of particular importance to Judge Dalzell was the "democratizing"
effect of the Internet on speech. 146 Consider Judge Dalzell's description
of further basic attributes that distinguish the Internet from other means
of mass communication for First Amendment purposes:
First, the Internet presents very low barriers to entry.
Second, these barriers to entry are identical for both
speakers and listeners. Third, as a result of these low
barriers, astoundingly diverse content is available on the
Internet. Fourth, the Internet provides significant access
to all who wish to speak in the medium, and even creates
a relative parity among speakers. 147
Judge Dalzell continued: "Individual citizens of limited means can speak
to a worldwide audience on issues of concern to them." 148 Other means
of mass communication, such as newspapers, radio and television, re-
quire enormous investments of capital, labor and time. Internet speech is
available for those with access to a computer. It also removes the filter
of the other means of mass communication thereby allowing for more
diversity of thought. Speech of all stripes, character, and sophistication
can be found on innumerable topics from politics to dog-grooming. 149
Judge Dalzell characterized the government's premise as being that the
Internet's "failure" was making too much speech too available to too
broadcast standard of review to infringements on the liberties of cable operators, even though
they control an important communications medium. There is even less cause for a lower
standard here.").
143 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
144 Id.
145 Kay, supra note 100, at 371.
146 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 881.
147 Id. at 877.
148 Id. at 881.
149 Id.
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many people. He asserted that "[t]his is exactly the benefit of Internet
communication." 1 50
The danger of the CDA to Internet communication would be
profound. The economic impact of trying to comply with the speech
restrictions would force many content providers off the Internet.' 5 1
Well-financed individuals and large corporations, some of which already
dominate more conventional forms of media, would be able to afford the
cost of compliance. The result would be a withering of diverse views
and a homogenization of content that would mirror the views already
expressed in the mainstream media. This would destroy the whole char-
acter of Internet communication.
2. Judge Sloviter, Obscenity, and Strict Scrutiny
Judge Sloviter found the CDA discriminated against First Amend-
ment non-obscene protected speech based on its content 52 and therefore
reviewed the statute with strict scrutiny. Where the government restricts
speech based on the content of the ideas contained therein the govern-
ment is at its most intrusive. Where a statute makes content-based dis-
tinctions in speech regulation, the courts apply a strict level of
scrutiny. 153 The statute will survive such scrutiny if the government reg-
ulation serves a compelling interest and the means it uses are narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest.
Many subjects available on the Internet are not obscene but may be
labeled as patently offensive, at least in some communities. 154 Under the
150 Id.
151 Id. at 879 ("Perversely, commercial pornographers would remain relatively unaffected
by the (CDA), since we learned that most of them already use credit card or adult verification
anyway."). They would thus be able to raise one of the specific CDA defenses.
152 Id. at 855.
'53 Ia
154 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) (where the Court defined obscenity so
that it varied from jurisdiction to jurisdiction based on "contemporary community standards.").
This portion of the Miller obscenity test was imported into the area of indecent and "patently
offensive" speech in Pacifica and through FCC regulation. In the Internet context, the issue of
which contemporary community standard to apply is problematic because Internet communi-
cation cannot be effectively limited to one location. See John S. Zanghi, Community Stan-
dards in Cyberspace, 21 U. DAYTON L. Rv. 95, 114-16 (1995) (advocating a new obscenity
test for the Internet focusing the standard on the word "contemporary," not "community");
William S. Byassee, Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying Real World Precedent to the Vir-
tual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST L. Rnv. 197 (1995). But see Keith A. Ditthavong, Paving
the Way for Women on the Information Superhighway: Curbing Sexism Not Freedoms, 4 AM.
U. J. GENDER & L. 455, 506 (1996) ("Attempting to create a national standard of what consti-
tutes in a nation that is as diverse in culture as it is in morality is a social and legal impossibil-
ity."). In United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 74
(1996), a California couple who posted certain material on their web site were tried and con-
victed in Tennessee under a Federal obscenity statute, 18 U.S.C. 1465, by a jury applying
Tennessee community standards. Justice Burger in Miller stated "it is neither realistic nor
constitutionally sound to read the First Amendment as requiring the people of Maine or Mis-
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CDA provisions challenged in ACLU, the person or organization posting
such material on the Internet would be subject to prosecution in those
communities. Judge Sloviter criticized Congress and the Justice Depart-
ment for relying on examples of Internet speech that would fall well on
the prosecutable side of the line. 155 These included "hard-core porno-
graphic materials (even if not technically obscene)."' 56 These examples
did not address the plaintiffs' allegations that the CDA's definitions of
indecency are so imprecise that prosecutions will not be limited to the
hard-core, but will extend to valuable protected speech on controversial
subjects. Individuals could be prosecuted under the CDA merely be-
cause their ideas or language are unpopular, which is exactly the type of
government behavior the First Amendment is designed to prevent.
Judge Sloviter offered examples of non-obscene, but potentially
"indecent" material that might be prosecuted under the CDA. These ex-
amples included the Broadway play "Angels in America" which uses
graphic language regarding homosexuality and AIDS, news articles
about female genital mutilation, and National Geographic style photo-
graphs of sexually explicit sculptures in India.157 Other examples in-
cluded advice to sexually active minors about methods for practicing
safer sex, and some feminist literature.' 58
Judge Sloviter determined that the CDA acted as a content-based
restriction on speech.159 She reached this conclusion because a prosecu-
tor could only determine that a particular message on the Internet vio-
lated the CDA by reading the message's content and then categorizing
the message by the ideas it contained. Government hostility to "inde-
cent" or "patently offensive" ideas is the hallmark of content-based re-
strictions. 160 To let the government regulate what is decent or indecent is
sissippi accept public depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las Vegas or New York City."
Miller, 413 U.S. at 32. But this may not effectively be applied to a world-wide medium that,
unlike print or broadcast media, loses control of its distribution channel upon sending out a
message.
155 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 853.
156 Id.
157 Id. at 852-53.
158 Nadine Strossen, Hate Speech and Pornography: Do We Have to Choose Between
Freedom of Speech and Equality?, 46 CASE W. REs. L. Rav. 449, 471-72 (1996) (discussing
application of Canadian Supreme Court decision Butler v. The Queen, 1 S.C.R. 452 (1992)
(Can.) leading to the banning of books by anti-pornography advocate Andrea Dworkin, and
other feminist literature).
159 See supra note 152.
160 The government argued in its brief that a lesser standard of review applies to certain
broadcast media and that the Internet regulations should be given the same level of reduced
scrutiny as broadcast television and radio. Judge Sloviter leaves that argument to Judge Dal-
zell and this article addresses it more fully in section V. B. 1., supra.
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to let the government decide what one may discuss and debate. 161 There-
fore the court's application of strict scrutiny to the CDA was proper.
Judge Sloviter assumed for analytical purposes a compelling gov-
ernment interest in children's access to certain materials available on the
Internet.' 62 Her ultimate conclusion was that the CDA was not narrowly
tailored to achieve that government interest. As discussed supra, under
strict judicial scrutiny analysis the government must establish that a con-
tent-based regulation of protected First Amendment speech has used the
least restrictive means to achieve the asserted compelling interest. The
CDA failed the "least restrictive means" test in an obvious fashion. If
Congress is concerned with child pornography, 63 obscenity, sexual
abuse, and sexual predators on the Internet, then it should effectively
enforce existing laws already designed to prevent and punish such
conduct.
Judge Sloviter held that the CDA was not narrowly tailored despite
statutory defenses regarding "good faith" efforts to limit minors' access
or use age verification technology. Congress could not draw a line pre-
cise enough to limit minors' access to indecent material while simultane-
ously protecting adult access to the same material.' 64 Judge Sloviter
161 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971) ("we cannot indulge the facile as-
sumption that one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of sup-
pressing ideas in the process. Indeed, governments might soon seize upon the censorship of
particular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of unpopular views.'); Stros-
sen, supra note 158, at 465-70, 473-78.
162 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 853 (Sloviter, J.) ("I am far less confident than the government
that.., it has shown a compelling interest in regulating the vast range of online material
covered or potentially covered by the CDA. Nonetheless, I acknowledge that there is certainly
a compelling interest to shield a substantial number of minors from some of the online material
that motivated Congress to enact the CDA, and do not rest my decision on the inadequacy of
the government's showing in this regard.").
163 There is a difference between child pornography and children viewing indecent mate-
rial. In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), the Court addressed the harm caused to a
child by participating in the creation of pornography and the subsequent distribution of that
pornography. The Court upheld the criminal penalties for five reasons. First, the actual use of
children as participants in the pornography was "harmful to the physiological, emotional, and
mental health of the child.' Id. at 758. Second, attacking the economic chain of distribution in
the child pornography industry would promote the government's interest, because it was the
only portion of the industry forced into public view to achieve its economic goals. Further, the
distribution of the photographs compounded the harm to children by maintaining and circulat-
ing the record of the abuse. Third, the pornographers could not shield themselves behind the
First Amendment where the government objective was to attack the economic motive behind
an admittedly illegal activity. Fourth, the Court found a de minimis value for visual child
pornography as an adjunct to literary, artistic, scientific or educational work. Fifth, child por-
nography is a category of speech not protected by the First Amendment because "the evil to be
restricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no pro-
cess of case-by-case adjudication is required" for visual child pornography. The Court in
Ferber focused on the child abused creating the pornography not the problem of other chil-
dren viewing that pornography.
164 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 855.
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found the government's distinctions inadequate, or technologically or ec-
onomically unfeasible. 165 Generally, Internet speakers cannot control
where or by whom their messages will be read. Though some age
screening methods are available, implementing them is cost prohibitive.
Most non-profit organizations and many for-profit organizations would
be forced to stop speaking because they could not afford the technology
to comply with the CDA. 166 Even those who implemented the technol-
ogy would not be certain they could screen out all minors, and therefore
might also self-censor to protect themselves from liability.167
Specifically, credit card and adult personal identification numbers
are "not technologically or economically feasible for most providers." 168
Another defense provided by the CDA is the use of available technology
to prevent access by minors. No such technology exists that is practical
for most providers.169 In addition, the use of "tagging" is dependent on
the creator of the site properly evaluating and tagging its site and on
parents loading software that would read the tagging scheme. Informa-
tion providers would need to rely on parents, teachers and others to im-
plement the software programs and the failure of these third parties
would subject the provider to liability.170 Creating better tagging tech-
nology would not solve the problem. The labor intensive task of screen-
ing all messages posted on a bulletin board, for example, would force
many providers to limit or cease operating. 17a
Judge Sloviter also rejected the government argument that the CDA
should be upheld because the court's decision would create a need for
blocking material which would be satisfied by "the 'creative genius' of
the Internet community" and presumably by economic market forces.172
Judge Sloviter stated that "I can imagine few arguments less likely to
persuade a court to uphold a criminal statute than one that depends on
future technology to cabin the reach of the statute within constitutional
bounds."173
In ACLU the government argued that the legislature provided cer-
tain defenses for speakers in an attempt to insulate the speakers from
prosecution. Nonetheless, as Judge Sloviter points out, the threat of
criminal penalties under a speech restrictive statute such as the CDA
165 Id.
166 Id.
167 But see Ditthavong, supra note 154, at 501-06 (proposing legislation limiting Internet
pornography, but providing defenses for system operators if they used "age validation checks"
or lacked knowledge of the posting of pornography on their sites).
168 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 856.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id. at 849, 856.
172 Id. at 857.
173 Id.
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does not permit speakers the comfort of exercising First Amendment
rights without looking over their shoulder.174 The government's "reas-
surance" that after indictment one may raise certain defenses would not
prevent a chill on Internet communication, since it is unclear what might
be prosecuted under the CDA.
3. Judge Buckwalter and the Vagueness Doctrine
Iii ACLU, Judge Buckwalter discussed the unconstitutional vague-
ness of the terms "patently offensive" and "indecent" in the CDA. 175
Freedom of speech is chilled when speakers can not ascertain if their
expression violates a vaguely-worded statute. Those who might other-
wise venture close to the restricted area instead steer clear because of the
threat of prosecution. The legislature's failure to adequately define
speech restrictions results in self-censorship by citizens too fearful to
speak.
The vagueness issue has apparently been disposed of by Denver
Area where Justice Breyer's plurality opinion found that language defin-
ing "patently offensive" in the cable television context was not unconsti-
tutionally vague because it was similar enough to "language previously
used by this Court for roughly similar purposes." 176 The Court and the
FCC have dealt with those terms a sufficient number of times to give
174 Id. at 856-57.
175 The doctrine of vagueness seeks to vindicate three related policy goals. Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972). First, the language of the statute must provide
clear enough definitions of its terms to alert individuals subject to its strictures as to what is
prohibited and what is acceptable behavior. In short, it is a matter of notice. ACLU, 929 F.
Supp. at 860. Second, clear definitions of the statute's terms restricts the discretion of enforce-
ment officials who may otherwise use it in a selective or arbitrary manner. As Judge
Buckwalter writes, it is a question "of simple fairness." Id. Third, in the free speech context,
protected speech will be chilled because speakers will not wish to risk potential prosecution.
Unconstitutionally vague speech restrictions interrupt the free flow of ideas crucial to a de-
mocracy. ld.
Judge Buckwalter found the CDA unconstitutionally vague, but specifically refused to
make a sweeping ruling on the appropriate standard for free speech on the Internet. In this
regard his opinion anticipated Justice Breyer's opinion in Denver Area counseling caution in
determining the proper approach to free speech cases in new media. Judge Buckwalter con-
cluded that future regulation of Internet speech is possible if the statute's language is clearer
and the restrictions are "sensitive to the unique qualities" of the Internet as a communication
medium. Id. at 859.
Judge Buckwalter quotes from Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 151 (1959): "This court
has intimated that stricter standards of permissible statutory vagueness may be applied to a
statute having a potentially inhibiting effect on speech; a man may the less be required to act at
his peril here, because the free dissemination of ideas may be the loser." The CDA does not
place any limitations on a prosecutor's interpretation of the two terms. The statutory defini-
tions are absent so no guide exists to warn citizens away from prohibited speech or to restrain
prosecutors from attacking permitted speech. ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 860.
176 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2389-90 (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973); and Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748, 750).
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some reasonable level of definition and notice to speakers who may en-
gage in speech bordering on the patently offensive. 177
VI. FINDING THE APPROPRIATE ANALOGY OF
COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA ATTRIBUTES IN THE
INTERNET CONTEXT
A. THE ARCHITECTURE OF THE INTERNET AND THE INAPPLICABILITY
OF THE CABLE REGULATION ANALOGY
The lesson of the Denver Area plurality is that a court examines
each medium of expression on its own attributes with a cautious eye so
as not to inhibit a new means of communication with overly restrictive
regulation. The question then becomes: What are the attributes of the
Internet that will provide the best analogies for First Amendment analy-
sis? One commentator has likened discussion on the Internet to a town
meeting where everyone who wishes to participate has the opportu-
nity.178 Another commentator sees the Internet as the agora of ancient
Greece where citizens met to discuss the issues of the day. 179 It may also
be likened to a megaphone amplifying the reach of one's message, but at
the expense of potential intrusiveness. Each of these analogies ulti-
mately proves unsatisfactory, however, because none can fully accom-
modate the Internet's unique attributes - including its global scope,
diversity of perspective found beyond one's geographic-political setting,
access to information, and ability for self expression.' 80 Cable televi-
sion, broadcast television, and radio and print journalism represent inapt
analogies because they lack the interactive aspects of the Internet and
today are controlled by a limited number of people or entities. 8 1
Applying Justice Breyer's case analogy approach to the ACLU In-
ternet case, the government's constitutionally acceptable approach of al-
lowing cable operators to make an editorial decision that might restrict
cable programmers' speech under section 10(a) does not fit the Internet
177 Cf. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1338-39 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(Judge Ruth Bader Ginsburg (later Justice Ginsburg) rejecting a vagueness challenge to FCC
indecency regulations in the broadcast television context, because the courts had previously
upheld such provisions thereby giving broadcasters notice of the scope of the indecency defini-
tion). See Weinberg, supra note 71, at 221-23 (interpreting Judge Ginsburg's Action for Chil-
dren's Television decision).
178 Mike Godwin, The First On a New Frontier, QUILL, Sept. 1991, at 18, 19.
179 Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability: Challenges to
the First Amendment in Cyberspaces, 104 YALE_ L.i. 1639 (1995).
180 See Branscomb, supra note 179, at 1641-43 (discussing the Internet attribute of pro-
viding the opportunity to focus on words and ideas without preconceived notions about the
speaker's message based on the physical appearance, race or gender of the speaker); see also
id. at 1643, 1675-76 (discussing theoretical and practical limitations of anonymity on-line).
181 Ironically, media powers are rushing to go "on-line." See MSNBC, NEw YORK
TirM s, Delphi (Rupert Murdoch owned).
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model. While the government has a compelling interest in protecting
children in both settings, the three other factors in Justice Breyer's sec-
tion 10(a) analysis are not transferrable to the Internet setting. The con-
cern over balancing the access rights of cable programmers against the
editorial rights of cable operators is not analogous to the open access,
decentralized, interactive nature of the Internet. 182  Justice Breyer in
Denver Area also found significance in the permissive, rather than pro-
hibitory, nature of section 10(a). The three judges in ACLU found that
the CDA effectively created an absolute ban on "indecent" speech on the
Internet for many content providers. The Denver Area plurality's ration-
ale for finding section 10(a) constitutional is not applicable to the
Internet.
The Court's section 10(b) analysis also makes a poor analogy be-
cause that section does not parallel the CDA. Section 10(b) is an abso-
lute command to a central authority to "segregate and block" patently
offensive programming. No central authority exists on the Internet. Re-
quiring individual content providers to perform that function would re-
quire many speakers to be silent because of the financial and
administrative burdens. Also the speech of many ACLU plaintiffs is a
mixture of political and allegedly "indecent" speech. The ACLU court
found it was technologically infeasible to segregate only part of a site.
Justice Breyer's treatment of section 10(c) is also too fact specific to
the cable context to be applicable to the Internet context. The Internet's
wide-open architecture183 belies the existence of a central authority such
as a cable operator. 184 Therefore, the Internet context does not encounter
the issue of the government seizing or restoring editorial control to a
182 See Berman & Weitzner, supra note 9, at 1620 (positing that the best way to serve
First Amendment values is to preserve the Internet's "decentralized open access and user con-
trol over content," as well as minimizing government control).
183 See Berman & Weitzner, supra note 9, at 1628.
184 There is no parallel on the Internet to a preexisting monitoring authority for the com-
munity which could achieve the government's interest of protecting children more efficiently
and locally than the federal statute's program. Accordingly, using Denver Area's section
10(c) analogy, the CDA might pass constitutional muster because there is no alternative au-
thority to control patently offensive material on the Internet. The networking community,
however, has developed informal methods of control including "flaming," "bombing," and
"stick to the point." See Branscomb, supra note 179, at 1639, 1656-59 (describing the hostile
response to a flood of "junk mail" attorney advertising on the Internet); id. at 1659-60
(describing the debate regarding anonymous remallers that were viewed as a threat to "civil-
ity" on the Internet); Kay, supra note 100, at 385-387. See also Allegations of Child Porn
Close E-mail Operation, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 31, 1996, at A2 (an anonymous remailer relay
service was forced to close due to apparently false allegations that the service provided child
pornography).
The idea of local community organizations does not make sense for the Internet because
the community is not local. It is a world-wide medium and local community monitors apply-
ing contemporary community standards is problematic. See Branscomb, supra note 179, at
1652-53.
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central authority such as a cable operator. In Denver Area, Justice
Thomas foresaw conflicts due to the government usurping the First
Amendment editorial rights of cable operators by favoring access rights
of cable programmers. No such editorial interests are at stake in the In-
ternet context.
Further, the administrative nature of the Denver Area statute is dif-
ferent from the CDA, which imposes criminal sanctions on any user of
the Internet who engages in "patently offensive" speech. The difference
between criminal sanctions and a civil penalty imposed by the FCC is
significant. Forcing individuals to choose between their liberty and their
right to express otherwise protected speech is qualitatively different from
requiring a corporate cable operator to choose between forgoing potential
leased channel revenue and having the FCC place a note in the operator's
file for future licensing/franchising decisions. 185
B. INTERNET ACCESS BY CHILDREN AND IN THE HOME
The Denver Area plurality looks to the rationale for the rule, not a
blind adherence to a category. One must find the proper analogies for
the government's regulatory interest and the speaker's free speech inter-
est. Applying this approach to ACLU and the CDA's Internet regulation,
the government has a compelling interest in protecting children from in-
decent and patently offensive material, particularly when sent directly
into the home without the parents' ability to effectively screen the mate-
rial. In opposition to the government interest are adult speakers' and
listeners' interests in not having all Internet communications reduced to
that acceptable to a child, and being free of the threat of prosecution and
the chill on speech that a vague statute imposes on speakers.
Though analogies may be made to Pacifica, Denver Area, and Sa-
ble, they are ultimately unsatisfactory. The context of the indecent lan-
guage in Pacifica centered on the intrusive nature of the broadcast media
that "confronts the citizen, not only in public, but also in the privacy of
the home."'1 86 Prior warnings were of no avail to a listener who tuned in
185 See Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (re administrative penalty to broadcaster). In ACLU, Judge
Buckwalter found that the CDA's criminal sanctions implicate the Fifth Amendment's Due
Process clause as well as the First Amendment. The government cannot take away a person's
liberty or property without precisely defining what behavior violates the statute and invokes
the penalty. "Distilled to its essence, due process, is, of course, nothing more and nothing less
than fair play. If our citizens cannot rely on fair play in their relationship with their govern-
ment, the stature of our government as a shining example of democracy would be greatly
diminished." ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 859. In the First Amendment context, government's
failure to define precisely prohibited speech has consequences beyond those for the particular
individual jailed for his speech. Others will censor their own protected speech for fear of
prosecution. The rough and tumble of the contest among ideas will be diminished. The
CDA's language need not be perfect, but it fell far short of satisfying the First Amendment.
186 438 U.S. at 748.
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after the warnings were given. Furthermore, "broadcasting is uniquely
accessible to children, even those too young to read."187 The FCC did
not ban indecent language in broadcast media, but merely relegated it to
late night time slots when children were presumably asleep.
Cable television, like the radio broadcast in Pacifica, intrudes di-
rectly into the home and is accessible to the youngest and most vulnera-
ble children.188 Unlike Pacifica, however, Justice Souter in Denver Area
determined that in the cable television context, technology provides
greater control over the flow of information into the home (i.e., the V-
Chip).189
Like cable, telephone dial-a-porn is less intrusive than radio. In Sa-
ble the government was concerned with protecting children and unwill-
ing listeners from indecent and pornographic language available through
a dial-a-porn telephone business. The statute's total ban was too extreme
a remedy where callers to the service were willing listeners who were not
being surprised by intrusive broadcasts in their home, and most services
required use of a credit card or some other identifier that presumably
limited a child's access.
Justice Breyer specifically distinguished Sable from the cable televi-
sion context because in Sable there "was not only a total governmentally
imposed ban on a category of communications, but also involved a com-
munications medium, telephone service, that was significantly less likely
to expose children to the banned material, was less intrusive and allowed
for significantly more control over what comes into the home than either
broadcasting or the cable transmission service before us."' 90
Sable's reasoning transfers readily to the Internet context. Justice
Breyer's description of the unconstitutional regulation of pornographic
speech over the telephone fits the challenged regulation of indecent
speech over the Internet.' 9 ' "Going on-line" is volitional, and finding an
indecent site on the Internet is not as simple as flipping a switch on the
187 Ld. at749.
188 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2401 (Souter, J.).
189 l at 2402. Justice Souter cites Turner Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622,
114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994), as an example of how cable television defies neat categories. In
Turner, the Court found that cable television was not like broadcast television "with respect to
the factors justifying intrusive access requirements under the rule in Red Lion." Denver Area,
116 S. Ct. at 2401 (Souter, J., concurring). But cable television is like broadcast television and
radio when viewed using the Pacifica rationale for regulation. See Kay, Sexuality on the
Internet, supra note 100, at 383.
190 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2388 (Breyer, J., plurality opinion).
191 Kay, supra note 100. But see Berman & Weitzner, supra note 9, at 1632 (analysis of
telephone system speech regulation is not an appropriate model for Internet speech regulation
because the interactive nature of the Internet "offers users the ability to exercise control over
precisely what information they access.").
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radio or television dial (or remote control). 192 Rather, it is more akin to
selecting a phone number, dialing it, and then staying on the line after the
dial-a-porn provider has identified itself, but before the pornographic lan-
guage begins. The "listener" in the Internet and dial-a-porn contexts are
not unwilling listeners, captive audiences, nor victims of an unannounced
assault in their homes.
The telephone analogy breaks down, however, because the danger
to children is dramatically reduced in the context of the Internet. The
child "too young to read," who is affected by the language in the
Pacifica or Sable contexts is most likely not at risk on the Internet be-
cause to gain access to indecent language one must be able to send, re-
ceive, or select a written message. Even children who can read must
possess a certain level of verbal sophistication to navigate to a site con-
taining indecency. 193 Furthermore, while the Internet is different from
cable and radio for the same reasons that telephone service is distinguish-
able from cable and radio, most pornography businesses' sites also dis-
play their message only after warnings that the site contains adult
content. 194  One cannot just "tune in" to an Internet source without
catching the warning as can be done in the cable and radio contexts.
C. APPLYING THE PUBLIC FORUM APPROACH
Justice Kennedy's public forum, content-based First Amendment
analysis may be applied to government restrictions on Internet speech.
Like the plurality in Denver Area, Justice Kennedy recognized the power
that new means of communication have in shaping ideas, debate and ac-
cess to information. Justice Kennedy anticipated the complexities sure to
attend application of the Court's First Amendment jurisprudence to In-
ternet speech restrictions. He stated the following:
Minds are not changed in streets and parks as they once
were. To an increasing degree, the more significant in-
terchanges of ideas and shaping of public consciousness
occur in mass and electronic media. The extent of public
entitlement to participate in those means of communica-
tion may be changed as technologies change; and in ex-
panding those entitlements the Government has no
greater right to discriminate on suspect grounds than it
does when it effects a ban on speech against the back-
drop of the entitlements to which we have been more
192 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 844, 876 n.19 (Judge Dalzell noted that "we have found as a
fact that operation of a computer is not as simple as turning on a television, and that the
assaultive nature of television is quite absent in Internet use.") (internal citations omitted).
193 Id. at 844, 876.
194 Id. at 844.
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accustomed. It contravenes the First Amendment to give
Government a general license to single out some catego-
ries of speech for lesser protection so long as it stops
short of viewpoint discrimination. 195
Justice Kennedy would not find the government's discrimination
against "patently offensive" and indecent speech on the Internet any
more agreeable than the government's restrictions on "patently offen-
sive" cable programming. In both cases the government has placed spe-
cial burdens on communicating a type of speech whose content it
disfavors. Accordingly, if cable television speech restrictions are subject
to strict scrutiny then Internet speech restrictions must also be subject to
strict scrutiny.
In Lee, 196 Justice Kennedy set forth a method for determining when
an area is a public forum. In discussing the public forum attributes of a
government-owned airport terminal he stated:
our public forum doctrine must ... allow the creation of
public forums which do not fit within the narrow tradi-
tion of streets, sidewalks, and parks. Under the proper
circumstances I would accord public forum status to
other forms of property, regardless of its ancient or con-
temporary origins and whether or not it fits within a nar-
row historic tradition. If the objective, physical
characteristics of the property at issue and the actual
public access and uses ... indicate that expressive activ-
ity would be appropriate and compatible with those uses,
the property is a public forum.197
The Internet meets Justice Kennedy's test of a public forum based
on its architecture and the enormous degree of public access and partici-
pation.' 98 It is an open meeting place for all members of the public
195 Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2415-16 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
196 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring); see Lee v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S.
830 (1992) (per curiam).
197 International Soc'y, 505 U.S. at 698.
198 The telecommunications ancestors of the Internet were originally organized by the
government to create communications links for the military in the event of disruption of nor-
mal means of communications during war time. Though the entity that we call the "Internet"
has grown dramatically and is different from its initial scope, it was still created by the govern-
ment as a speech forum and therefore is subject to the public forum doctrine.
If one views changes in the nature of the Internet as too dramatic to categorize it as the
same entity as originally created, it nevertheless may be subject to the public forum doctrine.
Justice Kennedy in Denver Area characterized public access channels on cable television as
public fora. This was true "even though they operate over property to which the cable operator
holds title." Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2409 (Kennedy, J. concurring (citing Cornelius v.
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where ideas are exchanged, issues are debated, and self expression flour-
ishes. Justice Kennedy also found public access cable channels to be
government designated public forums because the government created
and dedicated them to public speech. No entity need dedicate the In-
ternet to free communication of ideas because that has been its purpose
from its inception.
Applying Justice Kennedy's use of the common carrier analogy to
the Internet has support at the policy level for at least four reasons. First,
under the common carrier approach, efficiency of service would suffer if
bulletin board operators or other systems operators were required to
monitor messages. Second, the approach properly adopts the idea that it
is unfair to hold common carriers to knowing what constitutes an inde-
cent message in communities around the country. Third, the approach
accepts that monitoring of messages invades an individual's privacy. Fi-
nally, this approach correctly understands the difficulty of packet switch-
ing technology. Although this technology routes messages and parts of
messages through various networks, the operator of that network may
only have "possession" of the indecent message for a moment, making
criminal liability problematic. 199 If private, "indecent" speech over a
common carrier such as a telephone can not be restricted, then the same
speech on the Internet can not be regulated.
D. THE VILLAGE GREEN ANALOGY
The Internet has become the new "village green" for voicing ideas
and persuading one's listeners.200 The village green was traditionally a
central meeting place of universal access, like a town square or park,
where different views might be aired by any speaker. The Internet fits
this model by providing dramatic opportunities for access and expression
for the common citizen.
Other mediums of communication do not provide an adequate anal-
ogy. The interactive, wide-open Internet communication system clearly
is not analogous to the hierarchical "bottleneck" of corporate-controlled
television communication systems (broadcasting being the medium the
Court has been most willing to allow the government to regulate). The
Internet's text-driven content and its infinite number of potential speak-
ers is not analogous to cable or broadcast television's easily accessible
visual content and its limited spectrum or number of cable channels.
NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)). Applying the public
forum doctrine to the Internet, which is not "owned" by anyone, would be less intrusive than
applying it to privately owned property.
199 Kay, supra note 100, at 373-374.
200 ACLU, 929 F. Supp. at 882 (Dalzell, J.) ("The Internet is a far more speech enhancing
medium than print, the village green, or the mails.").
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Although the Internet is, in some ways, as accessible as a telephone, the
comparison does not fit when considering the Internet's ability to com-
municate ideas to a mass audience.
The best analogy is to the village green or town square. 20' There,
speakers and listeners congregated to exchange ideas on matters of inter-
est to them. The potentially large number of participants and the fluid
manner in which their roles changed, from speaker to listener and back to
speaker again, mirror Internet communication. On the village green, ob-
scene speech is outside the protection of the First Amendment and may
be prohibited and prosecuted. Indecent and offensive speech, however,
are protected and the listener's recourse is to avert one's eyes or avoid
that part of the discussion. If a parent wishes to shield a child from that
form of speech, the parent can supervise the child to assure that the child
does not enter the "adult bookstore" of the village green.
The parent should likewise be responsible for monitoring the child's
behavior or blocking the child's access to such materials available on the
Internet.202 This leads to the quite unrevolutionary observation that the
proper parties to raise children and monitor their behavior are the chil-
dren's parents, not the government.
Justice Breyer's concern that the government not be left defenseless
to solve problems associated with new media would not be left unad-
dressed. The government can still restrict the time, place, and manner of
speech in a content-neutral manner, provided it advances an important
government interest while restricting speech no more than necessary and
leaving open alternate channels of communication. This is true of any
speech regulation case, even those on the traditional public fora of
streets, parks, and village greens.
An additional advantage of employing the village green analogy is
that it allows the four justices in the Denver Area plurality opinion to
find common ground with the public forum approach advocated by Jus-
tice Kennedy in his Denver Area opinion. The village green is the clas-
sic public forum "held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of
mind.... used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts be-
tween citizens, and discussing public questions. ' 20 3 Though the newest
forum for communication, the Internet is the functional equivalent of the
traditional village green. Justice Kennedy stated that public access chan-
201 In Denver Area, Justice Kennedy quotes the House Report for the for the 1984 Cable
Act which describes public access channels as 'the video equivalent of the speaker's soapbox
or the electronic parallel to the printed leaflet. They provide groups and individuals who
generally have not had access to the electronic media with the opportunity to become sources
of information in the electronic marketplace of ideas." Denver Area, 116 S. Ct. at 2409 (citing
H.R. Rep. No. 934, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. At 30 (1984)).
202 See Berman & Weitzner, supra note 9, at 1633.
203 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939).
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nels on cable systems are public fora because they provide access for the
public to communicate to a broad audience. The Internet dramatically
multiplies the opportunity to speak and simultaneously empowers listen-
ers to choose the topic in which they wish to be engaged.
VH. CONCLUSION
Justice Breyer preferred a "go-slow" approach in the regulation of
the cable television context. He searched case precedent for analogies to
other communications systems' attributes, and hesitated to bind the de-
velopment of the new media by forcing it into a pre-existing strict cate-
gory of speech analysis. In the rapidly evolving technology
communications context he preferred a case-by-case analogy approach
rather than handcuffing the technology with inappropriate rules. Indeed,
in this era of deregulation, differing communications technologies are
converging into one system. There may be a day in the not too distant
future where telephone, television, and computer services all reach the
home through the same technology system. Speech regulation may warp
and shift the potential of the new medium in unanticipated ways.
Using Denver Area as a guide, Justice Kennedy would apply a more
categorical approach. He would find the Internet to be a public forum,
and that the CDA discriminated against indecent speech based on its con-
tent. Therefore, he would apply strict scrutiny and find that the CDA
was not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.
If the four Justices in the plurality opinion along with Justice Ken-
nedy and Justice Ginsburg (who concurred in Justice Kennedy's opinion)
would all employ the village green analogy, the Court would produce a
majority opinion striking down the regulation of indecent speech on the
Internet. This would provide clear guidance to lower courts, potential
regulators and prosecutors, and Internet speakers. It would also prevent
a chilling silence from falling over the electronic village green.
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